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Abstract
Background: Moral hazard or utilization hazard refers to the phenomenon during which patients overuse medical
services under national health insurance (NHI) because the services are free or the patients are required to pay only
a portion of the utilization costs. The aim of this study is to investigate how NHI and private health insurance (PHI)
systems influence increases in health care utilization rates.
Methods: We designed a longitudinal study to examine the utilization of healthcare services between those
insured with NHI or PHI and uninsured Koreans using nationally representative four-year panel data from 13,798
participants. This study was conducted using hierarchical multivariate Poisson regression analyses in which
covariates and interaction terms are applied after adjusting for the heterogeneous treatment effect.
Results: After adjusting covariates including disease status, lower income Koreans who were covered by medical
aid were respectively 2.26 and 1.23 times more likely to receive inpatient care and outpatient care than those who
were covered by NHI. When the interaction term of type of insurance was included in the model, those were
covered by both medical aid and PHI were respectively 2.38 and 1.25 times more likely to receive inpatient care
and outpatient care than those who were covered by only NHI.
Conclusions: The moral hazard behind insurance membership, depending on how NHI maintains policies to confer
benefits, may give rise to differences in medical utilization. This phenomenon must be closely monitored to find a
way to reform NHI when the rights of medical service consumers are solidified through PHI.
Keywords: National health insurance, Private health insurance, Medical service utilization, Moral hazard, South Korea
Background
The health care system in the Republic of Korea is
implemented under the National Health Insurance
(NHI) program, which is compulsory by law and is a
universal social insurance program that covers the en-
tire population (Fig. 1). This system is operated by
the NHI Service (NHIS) under the supervision of the
Korean government. The single insurer, termed the
NHIS, promotes the population’s health and strives to
improve social security by providing necessary health
care services pertaining to disease, injury, birth and
death (Fig. 2). It also operates a free medical aid pro-
gram as a form of public assistance for those in the
low-income bracket, for whom the application of
social insurance is difficult through NHI [1–3]. This
implies that medical aid in Korea plays an important role
as a social security system for those in the lower income
brackets, who pass a means test and who are subsidized
by local governments and not by the NHI system [1–4].
Patriots and veterans who receive benefits as a person of
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national merit are also included in the medical aid group.
The proportion of medical aid beneficiaries is about 3 %
of the total population in South Korea.
In spite of implementing the NHI system, the Korean
government is contemplating the expansion of private
health insurance (PHI) in the interest of patient sover-
eignty [3, 5, 6]. According to categories of the health
security system used by a previous study, the Korean
system may be primarily categorized as corporatism
supplemented by universalism [7]. The basic reasoning
behind this categorization is that health insurance
financing is based on individual insurance premiums,
while benefits such as welfare services are linked to
income [1, 8]. However, it is dubious as to whether
Korea’s NHI system is effective. When NHI coverage is
calculated as the ratio of public resources to individual
medical expenditures, the resulting rate of 57.2 % is far
less than the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) average of 71.3 % [9]. The
situation of Korea is thus identical to that of countries
such as Portugal, which must rely on PHI because the
income range is unsecured and limited [10]. The indi-
vidual purchase of PHI is part of liberalism; the nation’s
social security benefits are not sufficient such that
healthcare issues are primarily the responsibility of the
individual, whereas the supply of medical services is the
Fig. 1 Relations among major parties of Korean NHI. NHIS: National Health Insurance Service. HIRA: Health Insurance Review & Assessment
Service. MOHW: Ministry of Health and Welfare
Fig. 2 NHI system in South Korea. NHIS: National Health Insurance Service. HIRA: Health Insurance Review & Assessment Service. MOHW: Ministry
of Health and Welfare. Retrieved from http://www.nhis.or.kr/static/html/wbd/g/a/wbdga0401.html. (November 6, 2015)
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responsibility of the private sector [4, 11]. Of course,
many countries utilizing a NHI system endeavor to
incorporate the merits of liberalism by introducing
PHI, and Korea is not the only country to do so [6].
However, the consequences of doing so are rarely
discussed. This needs to be discussed by highlighting
how the type of health insurance affects the healthcare
service utilization of patients.
Moral hazard (also known as utilization hazard) is a
model based on behavioral economics. According to
basic economic theory, health insurance coverage may
cause a reduction in prevention activities, as it lowers
the cost of medical care and thereby reduces the finan-
cial and health consequences of illness [12]. This refers
to the phenomenon by which, unlike in the usual market
where, consumers pay the full price when purchasing
goods or services, patients overuse medical services
under NHI because they use medical services free of
charge or pay only a portion of the utilization costs [13].
In other words, given that insurance companies or the
state pays in part or in whole for their services, these
insurance subscribers have a tendency to use medical
services more than is necessary or to be negligent in
terms of health promotion [14]. Just as drivers who have
usually driven safely are likely to engage in reckless driv-
ing after subscribing to automobile insurance, people
who subscribe to NHI or PHI have a tendency to in-
crease the quantity of their medical utilization within
the scope of coverage. Regardless of whether it is NHI,
which is compulsory, or PHI, which is purchased volun-
tarily, once individuals benefit from having insurance,
there is the possibility that the phenomenon known as
moral hazard can arise [15–17]. Although the policy of
user fees is established to prevent the overuse of medical
services, it is not possible to make out-of-pocket pay-
ment amounts excessively high to strengthen the cover-
age of NHI. Moreover, medical aid beneficiaries are
exempt from paying user fees. In addition, higher income
groups, not satisfied with limited coverage and the low
quality of service, emphasize patient sovereignty and claim
that individuals should be encouraged to purchase various
types of PHI [11, 18]. However, little is known about
whether increased purchases of PHI will increase the
utilization of medical services under the NHI system.
Although it is economically rational behavior for
insurance subscribers to engage in more medical
utilization from the standpoint of patients, the welfare
loss decreases for the entire state [13, 19]. Conse-
quently, most countries that adopt social insurance-
type health security systems have institutionalized the
cost sharing of a portion of the fees by consumers
according to healthcare utilization. Through this, the
aim is to suppress unnecessary healthcare utilization
and to provide economic motivation so that consumers
will resolve their health problems without the seeking
of medical services [3, 13, 15, 20].
The Korean NHI implemented a co-payment ceiling
system to prevent the abuse of medical utilization and to
intensify the security efficiency of NHI, although types
of user fees are deductibles, co-insurance, ceiling system,
co-payment, and indemnity. The designated co-payment
rate is 32.1 % on average, but is almost double the
median of other OECD countries [1, 9, 21, 22]. However,
medical utilization behavior then changes in the direction
of not using services with less utility than out-of-pocket
payment, so that even at the same prices it becomes more
likely for those in the low-income strata to relinquish
medical utilization [16]. Unless there is a considerably
excessive demand in the medical service market, medical
utilization is very likely to decrease if the user burden
increases [22]. However, to further explore the current
moral hazard or utilization hazard model [19], it is neces-
sary to grasp medical service utilization behavior not
according to the user burden, where variation among indi-
viduals is not large under the NHI system, but according
to the type of NHI and PHI purchased.
In this respects, we focused on the interrelationship
between national and private health insurance having
influence on the insurer’s medical service utilization. In
order to forecast the macro consequences of PHI expan-
sion in the corporatism type, it is necessary to examine
the healthcare service utilization behavior of patients by
the insurance types. There are four types of health insur-
ance subscribers in Korea’s health security system: (1)
those with NHI but not PHI, (2) those with PHI but not
NHI, (3) those with both NHI and PHI, and (4) those
with neither NHI nor PHI (i.e., the basic livelihood
security recipients). Each group may pursue healthcare
utilizing behavior as a rational consumer.
The NHI promotes individuals’ healthcare utilization as
much as it does the benefits of NHI, and PHI reimburses
the users’ fees and uncovered health services. Thus, it is
very likely that it will facilitate healthcare utilization. If the
healthcare demands may fluctuate based on healthcare
coverage, and not on clinical diagnosis of disease, then this
is an unintended consequence that could damage finan-
cing of NHI [23]. Unlike the health security system, PHI
calculates the insurance cost based on the individual’s
level of risk; thus, it is more favorable for individuals with
relatively lower risk levels to select PHI [24]. Therefore, if
more individuals with relatively lower risk levels pur-
chase PHI, they can become an interested party who
demand the downsizing of the health security system.
For individuals who benefit from both the public and
private health insurance, their security is heightened
and burden is decreased [18, 25]. The increase of
healthcare utilization would probably occur on both
sides.
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Although Korea has achieved universal health cover-
age through its NHI scheme within such a short period,
high out-of-pocket payment and limited financial pro-
tection under the current national system have induced
a high demand for supplementary PHI. We examined
the effect of Korea’s NHI and PHI on health care
utilization. We also investigated to what extent health
care utilization—such as the inpatient and outpatient




The data used for this study derived from a survey of
13,798 respondents drawn from a nationally representa-
tive longitudinal sample of the Republic of Korea who par-
ticipated in the Korea Health Panel (KHP; www.khp.re.kr).
The members of this panel were recruited from October
2008 to January 2011 using a dual sampling frame of the
national population and housing census, and a combin-
ation of random digital dial and address-based sampling.
Respondents received nominal cash incentives to partici-
pate in this survey, which were administered by the Korea
Institute Health and Social Affairs in conjunction with
the NHIS. The KHP data include information on each
instance of medical service utilization and expenditure
as well as the individual’s NHI and PHI status. The par-
ticipants were required to collect all receipts of medical
expenses to alleviate the problem of recall bias. The
final response rate was 82.6 %. After excluding observa-
tions with missing values, we used a sample of 13,798
adults from 2008 (the first wave) as a 4-year unbalanced
panel data set.
Study design
We designed a longitudinal study to examine the utilization
of healthcare services between those insured with NHI/PHI
and those not insured with NHI/PHI using the 4-year
panel data. We modeled stratified Poisson regression
analyses by applying covariates and interaction terms
after adjusting for the heterogeneous treatment effect [26].
We used Poisson regression because the utilization
dependent variables are count measures with a skewed,
nonparametric distribution, and therefore standard para-




The outcome variables were the utilization of inpatient
care and outpatient care, in accordance with the litera-
ture [27]. We asked about the utilization of inpatient
care, including dental/oriental medicine hospitalization,
intensive care ward, and one-day inpatient stays during
the last year, and instances of outpatient visits, including
dental/oriental medicine treatment. The responses were
the total number of inpatient days and outpatient visits
during the last year among users.
Independent variables
Socioeconomic status We considered education and
household income as baseline independent variables
in the model in accordance with the knowledge that
healthcare utilization varies by socioeconomic status
[24, 28, 29]. The highest level of education completed
was collapsed into the following categories: elemen-
tary school or less, middle school/associate degree,
high school/associate degree, and college degree or
higher. Household income included earned income, fi-
nancial income, real estate income, and transfer in-
come, which were divided by the number of family
members, in accordance with the literature. The com-
putational definition used was (ß = 1, V = 0.5). The
household income was collapsed into the lowest 25
percent (1st quartile), middle 50%, and bottom 25 %,
with the highest 25 % (4th quartile) as the standard.
Household income adjusted by number of members in
the family was calculated as
Y= A þ ßBð Þv
where Y = average monthly income, A = number of
adults, B = number of non-adults, and ß and v = equal-
ized index
Types of health insurance Individuals reported their
NHI and PHI status, in accordance with the knowledge
that the status significantly determines healthcare
utilization [29, 30]. NHI status was assessed on the
response to the question, “Is your healthcare covered
by NHI or are you a medical aid beneficiary?” The
response was yes (i.e., the entire population, including
government employees with insurance bills) or no (i.e.,
basic livelihood security recipients or veterans/patriots).
PHI status was assessed on the basis of the question,
“Do you have any private health insurance or are you a
beneficiary who is reimbursed for medical expenses?”
with responses again categorized as yes or no. We did
not use the number of PHIs purchased as a measure,
since this is not significantly different from a dichotom-
ous measure, such as yes or no [30]. We thus classified
the whole sample into four categorical groups in terms
of insurance coverage: (1) covered by only NHI, (2)
covered by both the medical aid and PHI, (3) covered
by both NHI and PHI, and (4) covered by only the
medical aid program (Fig. 3).
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Covariates
We considered covariates in accordance with the previ-
ous literature [17, 31]. Respondents were queried for
sociodemographic characteristics of age, gender, chronic
diseases, and marital status.
Statistical analyses
We modeled hierarchical multivariable Poisson regres-
sion of the data to examine the effects of PHI on the
utilization of inpatient and outpatient care in the NHI
system, controlling for potential covariates like socioeco-
nomic status. First, descriptive statistics and frequencies
were run for all variables. Second, univariate chi-square
analyses were run for each predictor variable to identify
factors that were associated with the utilization of
inpatient and outpatient care. Finally, we ran Poisson
regression models by types of healthcare utilization with
increasing significance values and retaining covariates,
until we reached a model where all additional predictors
were significant at p < 0.05. Statistical analyses were




As detailed in Table 1, 52.3 % of the individuals were
women, 26.3 % were 60 years or older, and 72.2 % were
currently married. Most had a college degree or higher
(34.9 %). Almost all (95.7 %) had their healthcare
services covered by NHI, but 4.3 % who were below the
poverty line were covered by the medical aid. 79.6 %
received benefits from their own PHI, but 20.4 % had
not purchased PHI. The number of days receiving in-
patient care per year on average was 0.13 (SD = 0.5), ran-
ging from 0 to 12, and the number of visits receiving
outpatient care per year on average was 11.91 (SD =
19.14), ranging from 0 to 308 during the first year.
Differences between the utilization of inpatient and
outpatient care/non-utilization of inpatient and
outpatient care groups
As shown in Table 2, compared to the non-utilization
of inpatient care group, the utilization of inpatient
care group had more participants who were women
(p < 0.001), 60 years or older (p < 0.001), lower educa-
tional attainment (p < 0.001), and more individuals in
the highest quartile range of household income (p < 0.001).
Regarding health insurance, there was a gap between the
NHI-covered group and the medical aid beneficiaries in
terms of utilization of inpatient care (p < 0.001). There was
also a gap between subscribers and non-subscribers to
PHI (p < 0.001). Almost similar differences were shown
between the utilization of inpatient care and the non-
utilization of inpatient care groups. The utilization of the
outpatient care group consisted of more participants with
relatively higher educational attainment (p < 0.001). There
was a significant difference between the utilization of
inpatient and outpatient care and the non-utilization of
inpatient and outpatient care groups by types of health
insurance coverage (p < 0.001).
Influential factors pertaining to the utilization of inpatient
and outpatient care among panel participants
As detailed in Table 3, after controlling for covariates,
those who had completed elementary school or less were
1.36 times more likely to receive inpatient care as com-
pared to the participants with a college degree or higher,
as shown in Model II (95 % CI: 1.21–1.54). Moreover,
those in the highest income bracket were 1.15 times
more likely to receive inpatient care than those in the
Fig. 3 Four types of health insurance of this study (first wave, 2008). Note: NHI: National Health Insurance; PHI: Private Health Insurance
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lowest income bracket (95 % CI: 1.06–1.26). When we
added each of the health insurance factors in Model III
after controlling for covariates, medical aid beneficiar-
ies were 2.26 times more likely to receive inpatient
care than those who were covered by NHI (95 % CI:
2.01–2.53). When we added the interaction terms in
Model IV, those who were covered by both the medical
aid program and PHI were 2.38 times more likely to
receive inpatient care than those who were covered by
NHI (95 % CI: 1.97–2.76). On the other hand, those
who were covered by only medical aid had a tendency
to use services less than those who were covered by









N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
Gender
Men 6,584 (47.7) 6,800 (47.8) 6,377 (47.8) 5,894 (47.7)
Women 7,214 (52.3) 7,422 (52.2) 6,959 (52.2) 6,453 (52.3)
Age
20–29 1,943 (14.1) 2,006 (14.1) 1,851 (13.9) 1,407 (11.4)
30–39 2,893 (21.0) 2,828 (19.9) 2,528 (19.0) 2,138 (17.3)
40–49 2,953 (21.4) 3,071 (21.6) 2,855 (21.4) 2,715 (22.0)
50–59 2,381 (17.3) 2,440 (17.2) 2,277 (17.1) 2,235 (18.1)
60 or older 3,628 (26.3) 3,877 (27.3) 3,825 (28.7) 3,852 (31.2)
Chronic disease
Yes 6,474 (46.9) 7,642 (53.7) 7,626 (57.2) 7,630 (61.8)
No 7,324 (53.1) 6,580 (46.3) 5,710 (42.8) 4,717 (38.2)
Marital status
Single 2,300 (16.7) 2,569 (18.1) 2,383 (17.9) 2,043 (16.6)
Married couple 9,955 (72.2) 10,034 (70.6) 9,407 (70.5) 8,805 (71.3)
Divorced or Separated 392 (2.8) 410 (2.9) 397 (3.0) 386 (3.1)
Separation by death 1,151 (8.3) 1,209 (8.5) 1,149 (8.6) 1,113 (9.0)
Education
Elementary School or less 2,955 (21.4) 2,996 (21.1) 2,868 (21.5) 2,718 (22.0)
Middle School to associate 1,565 (11.3) 1,576 (11.1) 1,487 (11.2) 1,419 (11.5)
High School to associate 4,462 (32.3) 4,519 (31.8) 4,206 (31.5) 3,892 (31.5)
College Degree or higher 4,816 (34.9) 5,131 (36.1) 4,775 (35.8) 4,318 (35.0)
Household income
4st quartile (highest) 3,550 (25.7) 3,558 (25.0) 3,336 (25.0) 3,364 (27.3)
3st quartile 3,471 (25.2) 3,556 (25.0) 3,354 (25.2) 2,944 (23.8)
2st quartile 3,390 (24.6) 3,559 (25.0) 3,319 (24.9) 2,934 (23.8)
1st quartile (lowest) 3,387 (24.6) 3,549 (25.0) 3,327 (25.0) 3,105 (25.2)
Healthcare covered by NHI
Yes 13,207 (95.7) 13,563 (95.4) 12,642 (94.8) 11,732 (95.0)
No (medical aid) 591 (4.3) 659 (4.6) 694 (5.2) 615 (5.0)
Purchase of PHI
Yes 10,983 (79.6) 11,612 (81.7) 10,537 (79.0) 9,973 (80.8)
No 2,815 (20.4) 2,610 (18.4) 2,799 (21.0) 2,374 (19.2)
The number of days receiving inpatient care for a year 0.13 ± 0.50 (0–12) 0.16 ± 0.60 (0–22) 0.19 ± 0.68 (0–24) 0.19 ± 0.79 (0–41)
The number of visits receiving outpatient care for a year 11.91 ± 19.14 (0–308) 13.05 ± 21.15 (0–455) 14.60 ± 22.59 (0–350) 15.97 ± 24.49 (0–351)
Note: NHI National Health Insurance, PHI Private Health Insurance
The number of days receiving inpatient care and the number of visits receiving outpatient care are presented as mean ± SD (range)
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Table 2 Differences between the utilization of inpatient and outpatient care/non-utilization of inpatient and outpatient care groups,
2008 (n = 13,798)
Inpatient care Outpatient care
Utilization group Non-utilization group Chi square Utilization group Non-utilization group Chi square
(n = 818) (n = 12,980) p-value (n = 9,377) (n = 4,421) p-value
N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%)
Gender
Men 342 (41.8) 6,242 (48.1) <0.001 3,813 (40.7) 2,771 (62.7) <0.001
Women 476 (58.2) 6,738 (51.9) 5,564 (59.3) 1,650 (37.3)
Age
20–29 72 (8.8) 1,871 (14.4) <0.001 830 (8.9) 1,113 (25.1) <0.001
30–39 140 (17.1) 2,753 (21.2) 1,667 (17.8) 1,226 (27.7)
40–49 125 (15.3) 2,828 (21.8) 1,869 (19.8) 1,084 (24.5)
50–59 125 (15.3) 2,256 (17.4) 1,824 (19.5) 557 (12.7)
60 or older 356 (43.5) 3,272 (25.2) 3,187 (34.0) 441 (10.0)
Chronic disease
Yes 600 (73.4) 5,874 (45.3) <0.001 6,088 (64.9) 386 (8.7) <0.001
No 218 (26.6) 7,106 (54.7) 3,289 (35.1) 4,035 (91.3)
Marital status
Single 55 (6.7) 2,245 (17.3) <0.001 859 (9.2) 1,441 (32.6) <0.001
Married couple 619 (75.7) 9,336 (71.9) 7,207 (76.8) 2,748 (61.1)
Divorced or Separated 40 (4.9) 352 (2.7) 295 (3.2) 97 (2.2)
Separation by death 104 (12.7) 1,047 (8.1) 1,016 (10.8) 135 (3.1)
Education
Elementary School or less 283 (34.5) 2,672 (20.6) <0.001 2,554 (27.2) 401 (9.1) <0.001
Middle School to associate 101 (12.4) 1,464 (11.3) 1,257 (13.4) 308 (7.0)
High School to associate 238 (29.1) 4,224 (32.5) 2,926 (31.2) 1,536 (34.7)
Bachelor’s Degree or higher 196 (24.0) 4,620 (35.6) 2,640 (28.2) 2,176 (49.2)
Household income
4st quartile (highest) 294 (35.9) 3,256 (25.1) <0.001 2,708 (28.8) 842 (19.1) <0.001
3st quartile 185 (22.6) 3,286 (25.3) 2,269 (24.2) 1,202 (27.2)
2st quartile 175 (21.4) 3,215 (24.8) 2,161 (23.1) 1,229 (27.8)
1st quartile (lowest) 164 (20.1) 3,223 (24.8) 2,239 (23.9) 1,148 (25.9)
Healthcare covered by NHI
Yes 728 (89.0) 12,479 (96.1) <0.001 8,878 (94.6) 4,329 (97.9) <0.001
No (medical aid) 90 (11.0) 501 (3.9) 499 (5.4) 92 (2.1)
Purchase of PHI
Yes 605 (73.9) 10,378 (80.0) <0.001 7,291 (77.7) 3,692 (83.5) <0.001
No 213 (26.1) 2,602 (20.0) 2,086 (22.3) 729 (16.5)
Type of insurance
Covered by only NHI 157 (6.41) 2,291 (93.59) <0.001 1,775 (72.51) 673 (27.49) <0.001
Covered by only the medical aid 56 (15.26) 311 (84.74) 311 (84.74) 56 (15.26)
Covered by both NHI and PHI 571 (5.31) 10,188 (94.69) 7,103 (66.02) 3,656 (33.98)
Covered by both the medical aid and PHI 34 (15.18) 190 (84.82) 188 (83.93) 36 (16.07)
Note: NHI National Health Insurance, PHI Private Health Insurance
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both the medical aid program and PHI, and they were
2.37 times more likely to receive inpatient care than those
who were covered by only NHI (95 % CI: 2.00–2.75). We
also examined the effects of PHI on the utilization of out-
patient care in the NHI system (Table 4). When we added
each of the health insurance factors in Model III, the med-
ical aid beneficiaries were 1.23 times more likely to receive
outpatient care than those who were covered by NHI,
after controlling for covariates (95 % CI: 1.20–1.26). When
we added the interaction terms of the NHI and PHI
factors in Model IV, those who were covered by both the
medical aid program and PHI were 1.25 times more likely
to receive outpatient care than those who were covered by
only NHI (95 % CI: 1.21–1.29). In common with the
utilization of inpatient care, those who were covered by
only the medical aid showed a tendency to use fewer
services than those who were covered by both the medical
aid program and PHI, and they were 1.23 times more
likely to receive outpatient care than those who were
covered by only NHI (95 % CI: 1.19–1.26).
Table 3 Incidence risk ratio (IRR) and 95 % confidence interval (CI) of inpatient care utilization with four types of status of public
and private health insurance in the Korea Health Panel Survey, 2008–2011
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
IRR 95 % CI IRR 95 % CI IRR 95 % CI IRR 95 % CI
Gender (Ref.: Men) 1 1 1 1
Women 1.08* 1.01–1.16 1.05 0.97–1.12 1.07* 1.00–1.15 1.07* 1.00–1.15
Age (Ref.: 20–29) 1 1 1 1
30–39 0.81** 0.70–0.95 0.78** 0.67–0.91 0.76** 0.65–0.89 0.76** 0.65–0.89
40–49 0.67** 0.57–0.79 0.60** 0.51–0.71 0.58** 0.49–0.68 0.58** 0.49–0.68
50–59 0.85 0.72–1.01 0.73** 0.61–0.88 0.73** 0.61–0.87 0.73** 0.61–0.87
60 or older 1.31*** 1.11–1.55 1.05 0.87–1.26 1.05 0.87–1.26 1.05 0.87–1.26
Chronic disease (Ref.: No) 1 1 1 1
Yes 2.31*** 2.14–2.49 2.27*** 2.11–2.45 2.18*** 2.03–2.36 2.19*** 2.03–2.36
Marital status (Ref.: Single) 1 1 1 1
Married couple 1.99*** 1.72–2.31 1.98*** 1.71–2.89 2.08*** 1.80–2.41 2.08*** 1.80–2.41
Divorced or Separated 2.55*** 2.05–3.17 2.40*** 1.93–2.98 2.25*** 1.81–2.80 2.25*** 1.81–2.80
Separation by death 2.00*** 1.66–2.41 1.91*** 1.58–2.30 1.91*** 1.59–2.31 1.91*** 1.58–2.30
Education (Ref.: College Degree or higher) 1 1 1
High School to associate 1.23*** 1.12–1.35 1.20*** 1.10–1.32 1.20*** 1.10–1.32
Middle School to associate 1.26*** 1.11–1.43 1.19** 1.05–1.35 1.19** 1.05–1.35
Elementary School or less 1.36*** 1.21–1.54 1.31*** 1.16–1.48 1.31*** 1.16–1.48
Household income (Ref.: 1st quartile, lowest) 1 1 1
2st quartile 1.06 0.98–1.15 1.06 0.98–1.15 1.06 0.98–1.15
3st quartile 1.09* 1.01–1.18 1.07 0.99–1.17 1.07 0.99–1.17
4st quartile (highest) 1.15** 1.06–1.26 1.07 0.98–1.16 1.07 0.98–1.17
Healthcare covered by NHI (Ref.: Yes) 1
No (medical aid) 2.26*** 2.01–2.53
Purchase of PHI (Ref.: No) 1
Yes 1.06 0.98–1.15
NHI status x PHI status (Ref.: Covered by only NHI) 1
Covered by only the medical aid 2.37*** 2.00–2.75
Covered by both NHI and PHI 1.08 0.99–1.17
Covered by both the medical aid and PHI 2.38*** 1.97–2.76
Note: NHI National Health Insurance, PHI Private Health Insurance, Dependent variable: used inpatient care during the last year (1); not used inpatient care during
the last year (0)
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Discussion
User fees have increased substantially in many developed
countries during the last 20 years [21, 22, 32]. The hasty
introduction of a PHI program can lower essential
healthcare utilization by those who are economically
disadvantaged, while the advantages of the adoption of
PHI are relatively modest [33]. In the case of Korea,
however, there is a policy of medical aid, with a ceiling
system implemented along with a co-payment system,
which lessens the likelihood that poor individuals will
not have access to essential healthcare [21]. Rather, the
moral hazard phenomenon is becoming worse. In fact,
we found that healthcare utilization by the group with
medical aid who had more covered healthcare service
benefits was the highest compared to that of the group
with only NHI after controlling for their health status.
This could cause a crisis in NHI, which is based on so-
cial solidarity and risk pooling. We therefore examined
the effects of public and private health insurance on
medical service utilization in the health security system
Table 4 Incidence risk ratio (IRR) and 95 % confidence interval (CI) of outpatient care utilization with four types of status of public
and private health insurance in the Korea Health Panel Survey, 2008–2011
Model I Model II Model III Model IV
IRR 95 % CI IRR 95 % CI IRR 95 % CI IRR 95 % CI
Gender (Ref.: Men) 1 1 1 1
Women 1.58*** 1.53–1.63 1.52*** 1.47–1.57 1.52*** 1.47–1.57 1.52*** 1.48–1.57
Age (Ref.: 20–29) 1 1 1 1
30–39 1.09*** 1.05–1.13 1.05** 1.01–1.09 1.04* 1.01–1.09 1.05* 1.01–1.09
40–49 1.29*** 1.24–1.35 1.20*** 1.15–1.25 1.19*** 1.14–1.24 1.19*** 1.14–1.24
50–59 1.73*** 1.65–1.81 1.52*** 1.45–1.59 1.51*** 1.44–1.58 1.51*** 1.44–1.58
60 or older 2.40*** 2.29–2.51 2.04*** 1.94–2.14 2.03*** 1.93–2.13 2.03*** 1.93–2.13
Chronic disease (Ref.: No) 1 1 1 1
Yes 1.98*** 1.96–2.01 1.97*** 1.94–2.00 1.97*** 1.94–1.99 1.97*** 1.94–1.99
Marital status (Ref.: Single) 1 1 1 1
Married couple 1.73*** 1.66–1.81 1.67*** 1.60–1.75 1.69*** 1.61–1.79 1.69*** 1.61–1.76
Divorced or Separated 1.95*** 1.84–2.07 1.86*** 1.75–1.98 1.85*** 1.74–1.97 1.85*** 1.74–1.97
Separation by death 1.92*** 1.82–2.02 1.76*** 1.70–1.89 1.79*** 1.70–1.89 1.79*** 1.70–1.89
Education (Ref.: College Degree or higher) 1 1 1
High School to associate 1.16*** 1.12–1.21 1.15*** 1.11–1.19 1.15*** 1.11–1.19
Middle School to associate 1.34*** 1.28–1.41 1.33*** 1.27–1.39 1.33*** 1.27–1.39
Elementary School or less 1.55*** 1.48–1.63 1.53*** 1.46–1.60 1.53*** 1.46–1.60
Household income (Ref.: 1st quartile, lowest) 1 1 1 1
2st quartile 0.98** 0.97–0.99 0.98** 0.97–0.99 0.98** 0.97–0.99
3st quartile 0.99** 0.97–0.99 0.99 0.98–1.00 0.99 0.98–1.00
4st quartile (highest) 0.99 0.98–1.00 0.99 0.98–1.00 0.99 0.98–1.00
Healthcare covered by NHI (Ref.: Yes) 1
No (medical aid) 1.23*** 1.20–1.26
Purchase of PHI (Ref.: No) 1
Yes 1.02 0.99–1.03
NHI status x PHI status (Ref.: Covered by only NHI) 1
Covered by only the medical aid 1.23*** 1.19–1.26
Covered by both NHI and PHI 1.01 0.99–1.03
Covered by both the medical aid and PHI 1.25*** 1.21–1.29
Note NHI National Health Insurance, PHI Private Health Insurance, Dependent variable: used outpatient care during the last year (1); not used outpatient care
during the last year (0)
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of Korea. We also investigated possible instances of
moral hazard among individuals with PHI under Korea’s
universal health care system.
First, the medical aid beneficiaries who were offered
nearly free medical services were more likely to receive
inpatient and outpatient care than those who were
covered by only NHI. These results are consistent with
the findings of other studies, which reported that health
insurance coverage may cause a reduction in prevention
activities [15, 16]. There are also cost-sharing effects which
encourage moral hazard–induced utilization [19–21]. The
growth of the utilization of medical services due to the
expansion of the covered population could cause distor-
tions in the healthcare delivery system. The method of
supplementing the coverage of NHI, as it exists in Korea,
could thus weaken primary healthcare services and
therefore reduce the need for inpatient care through
preventive services, while also increasing household
medical expenses [34, 35]. When the management of
the insurance system is not clear, especially for vulner-
able groups, the public healthcare security system can
be detrimentally affected.
Second, although those who were covered by only
PHI had no significantly effect on medical utilization,
there was a positive correlation between these two vari-
ables. Moreover, according to an analysis of the inter-
action effect, those who were covered by both the
medical aid program and PHI were more likely to re-
ceive inpatient and outpatient care than those who
were covered by NHI. This is analogous to results pre-
sented in other reports [27, 30]. In those studies, the
probability of health care utilization was found to be
higher for when people have more PHI. The role of
PHI under NHI is usually to provide services which
cannot be included in the coverage given to the public
sector and to improve the quality of services [18].
However, it could eventually increase not only house-
hold medical expenses but also total government
spending on health care [6]. Another crucial problem is
the possibility that the middle and upper income
groups are able to receive more medical services
through PHI, whereas socially vulnerable groups have
difficulty obtaining medical services despite their
greater need. Those who enrolled in PHI under the
NHI system are usually people of high socioeconomic
status [24]. If this form of private insurance can serve
as a substitute for PHI among the types of PHI, it
would contribute to strengthening health equality.
However, a fringe benefit of supplementary PHI in
Korea is that it is strongly focused on commerciality,
which could worsen the health disparities between the
insured and non-insured and damage social solidarity.
For example, the supplementary PHI of France eventu-
ally worsened the degree of inequality in healthcare
utilization, and the portion of public expenditures on
national medical expenses was not reduced [25]. Thus,
policies for managing the borderline between PHI and
NHI more effectively and for securing the availability
of health services socially are needed to reduce health
inequality or disparities [36].
Nevertheless, several limitations of this study should
be noted. First, the severity of disease can affect the
quantity of healthcare utilization, but such a relation-
ship was not reflected in the model. However, this
study shows that the group with PHI has a greater
possibility of receiving outpatient care as well as in-
patient care, and the amounts are even higher for the
group with the medical aid. In the United States, given
that for any health problem only 8 to 9 out of 1,000
people in a local community receive inpatient care, the
phenomenon in which the increased cost of primary
healthcare services is related to the increase in in-
patient care can be considered as an outcome of moral
hazard [37]. Nevertheless, medical suppliers, including
the physician-induced demand phenomenon, make it
necessary to emphasize relevant information about
medical service utilization in the model. Second, the
health outcomes of the respondents after they had
received medical services were not reflected in the
model, implying that the effects of the insurance on the
patient health outcomes are unclear [38].
Conclusion
Healthcare utilization including inpatient and outpatient
care is critically determined by each patient’s behavior
before a doctor clinically determines what is causing the
patient’s symptoms. The significant finding of this study is
that differences in the quantity of healthcare utilization
are definitely related to whether a patient uses NHI or
PHI. This result reveals that expanding insurance coverage
is crucial for inducing the use of medical care after adjust-
ing for health status confounders. Hence, the social prob-
lem of “moral hazard can arise” with regard to insurance
membership depending on how the NHIS maintains
policies to confer effective benefits to patients, despite the
fact that it is difficult to predetermine what amount of
services is appropriate for a patient given their unique
situations. Moreover, the moral hazard phenomenon may
give rise to differences of medical utilization while also
resulting in a financial burden due to increasing overall
medical costs in South Korea. Hence, from this work,
which considers the access and use of medical services
under different insurance types, policymakers can obtain
helpful information when reforming the health care deliv-
ery system. Furthermore, they must scrutinize the insur-
ance system to determine how best to reform NHI in
order to solidify the rights of medical service consumers
through PHI.
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